Algebraic schemes in legal thought and in everyday morality by Hommers, Wilfried & Anderson, Norman A.
9 
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WILFRIED HOMMERS and NORMAN H. ANDERSON 
Legal thought may have unique value for cognitive science. A primary charac-
teristic of legal thought is its focus on valuation and integration of evidence. 
Even simple cases typically involve multiple pieces of evidence, each of which 
has to be evaluated for its implications with respect to the judgment to be 
made, and all of which have to be integrated to arrive at an overall judgment. 
In this respect, legal thought is similar to psychological decision theory, which 
is also concerned with valuation and integration of information. 
What is distinctive about legal thought is that it has been in the process of 
development for centuries, as illustrated in the historical survey of the concept 
of recompense (Hommers, 1983 a, 1986). The legal thought of today embodies 
the thinking of generations of legal scholars. Legal thought thus represents a 
highly developed, albeit complex system of knowledge that has an active role 
in the operation of society. Lawyers and judges must become experts in the 
understanding and use of this system of knowledge. Their own cognitive pro-
cesses are thus highly structured and so are of direct interest to psychological 
science. 
It is the theme of this chapter that legal thought and cognitive theory have 
much to offer each other. They have natural commonality in their mutual con-
cern with valuation and integration of evidence, as already noted, as well as 
commonality in relation to morality, which is as important in everyday lifeas 
in the law. Because of its long sociocultural development, legal thought may 
be considered an expert cognitive system, interesting in its own right, and also 
as a heuristic for the understanding of everyday morality. It should be fruitful, 
as Hommers (1981, 1985) has argued, to develop genuine two-way interaction 
between legal thought and cognitive theory. 
Algebraic schemes of evidence integration are considered in this chapter to 
illustrate one area for developing mutual interaction between legal thought and 
cognitive theory. Algebraic schemes have been suggested by many writers on 
legal thought, perhaps as a natural consequence of the primary problem of 
quantifying judgment to fit the offense and the offender. Independently, 
algebraic schemes have been considered in many areas of cognitive decision 
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theory, including moral judgment. These algebraic schemes provide an in-
teresting area for the two-way interaction with mutual benefit to both fields. 
One moral issue is considered here to illustrate some possibilities for such two-
way interaction. 
The Case of Recompense 
The case of recompense provides a good example for the study of algebraic 
schemes. Legal thought has long been concerned with recompense, as il-
lustrated in the prescription of the Judaic code that four sheep shall be repaid 
for one stolen sheep (Exodus, 22, 1). Other examples are given in the historical 
survey by Hommers (1983 a, 1986). Recently, psychologists have also begun to 
. study recompense in everyday morality (Piaget, 1932; Berscheid & Walster, 
1967). 
The case of recompense emphasizes the problem of integration, for 
recompense does not stand alone but in relation to some harmful act. Hence 
it is necessary to integrate the damage from the act together with the 
recompense to arrive at a judgment of deserved punishment. But this is not 
enough, for legal thought and everyday morality both agree that the culpa, in-
cluding intent and responsibility (Hommers, 1983 b), behind the harmful act 
must also be taken into account. Thus, all three variables have to be integrated 
to arrive at a judgment of deserved punishment. 
One specific hypothesis, suggested by both legal thought and everyday 
morality, is that the integration obeys the simple algebraic scheme 
Deserved Punishment = Culpa + Damage - Recompense. 
This may be called scheme S, since recompense reduces deserved punish-
ment by subtraction. This algebraic scheme parallels the blame schema studied 
in everyday morality (Anderson, 1983; Hommers & Anderson, 1985; Leon, 
1980; Surber, 1982) and also seems in line with § 46 of the Penal Code from 
1975 of the Federal Republic of Germany. According to Maurach, G6ssel, and 
Zipf (1978), two components of sentencing are distinguished: harmdoer and 
act, which correspond to culpa and damage in the cited scheme. Recompense 
is considered to affect both components: it diminishes the damage caused by 
the act; and it raises the moral character of the harmdoer, thereby diminishing 
culpa which depends on both purpose and negligence. A related legal scheme 
appears in the concept of mitigating circumstances of the British Court of Ap-
peal Criminal Division (Thomas, 1970). 
However, a different legal scheme for recompense has also been proposed. 
This appears in the sentencing theory of the German legal scholar Von Linstow 
(1974), who proposed a formula with 15 variables for calculating punishment 
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of traffic violations. Recompense was incorporated as a multiplicative factor 
with values between 0.8 and 1.0: 
Deserved Punishment = (Culpa+Damage) x Recompenes. 
By this formula, values of recompense less than 1 would reduce the deserv-
ed punishment. This may be called scheme M, since recompense reduces 
deserved punishment by multiplication. 
The existence of two different algebraic schemes raises two questions. First, 
which scheme ought the judge follow? This is the prescriptive question. Sec-
ond, which (if either) scheme is actually followed in intuitive judgment, by 
laypersons or by experts? This is the descriptive or cognitive question. Both 
questions are interesting and important. As a prescription Von Linstow's 
calculation rule has been criticized by legal scholars (e.g., Bruns, 1974, 1980; 
Zipf, 1977). The present discussion, however, is primarily concerned with the 
cognitive question, which, nevertheless, is relevant to the actual operation of 
legal systems. Despite their focus on the prescriptive question, legal schemes 
must make some allowance for nonprescriptive facts: human processing 
capabilities and human values. Accordingly, it is desirable to find some em-
pirical test of schemes Sand M. 
A fundamental difficulty arises in any attempt to test such algebraic 
schemes. This concerns measurement of values and is relevant even in a 
prescriptive context. To use either of the two schemes as prescriptions for 
judges' decision making, as Thomas (1970) and Von Linstow (1974) suggest, 
would require prior measurement of the values of culpa, damage, and 
recompense. But values are to some degree intuitive, not prescriptive, and are 
left in greater or lesser degree to the discretion of individual judges. This is 
clearly necessary for culpa, which is not objectively measurable but rather an 
attribution made by the judge. Even damage may involve nonmaterial com-
ponents, loss of reputation, for example, that must be evaluated by the in-
dividual judge's intuition. Although the same algebraic scheme may be 
prescribed for all judges, some nonprescriptive element of value must still be 
allowed for. Thus, even to apply schemes S and M as prescriptive rules is not 
generally possible without a means of measuring values. 
This measurement problem appears even more strongly in the descriptive 
cognitive approach, for different individuals clearly have different values ir-
respective of which of the two schemes is employed. Cognitive theory cannot 
prescribe what values a person ought to have, but instead must take cognizance 
of what they are. Two persons may both use scheme S to judge deserved 
punishment, but they will arrive at different judgments because they have dif-
ferent values, especially for the nonmaterial variable of culpa. To test whether 
they do indeed use scheme S, therefore, it seems necessary to know their per-
sonal values of culpa, damage, and recompense, for the values of one person 
will not add up to yield the judgments of the other person. 
A solution to this problem of measuring individuals' values at the same 
time as testing the scheme's validity has been developed as part of the func-
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tional measurement methodology of the theory of information integration 
(Anderson, 1981, 1982). The essential idea of functional measurement is to use 
the algebraic structure of the scheme as the base and frame for measurement. 
If the algebraic scheme holds empirically, the data from a suitably designed ex-
periment will exhibit a corresponding pattern. The pattern of the data is 
diagnostic of the operative scheme. The values themselves, moreover, may be 
derived from this data pattern. Functional measurement can thus transform 
the schemes from qualitative verbalisms to exact quantitative laws of cognition 
in combination with a solution of the measurement of the values. 
The following experiment illustrates how functional measurement 
methodology may be applied to test schemes S and M in an exact way. The sub-
jects in this experiment were laypersons. That was appropriate due to the 
demonstrational purposes of the experimental analysis, i.e., the testing of 
laypersons was not designed for drawing conclusions about actual expert deci-
sion-making. Since the very same method may be used to study judgments of 
legal experts, the extension of this approach to legal thinking is discussed in 
the second half of this chapter. 
Experimental Analysis 
Legal thought, as already indicated, has suggested two algebraic schemes for 
the effect of recompense. One claims that recompense is sub tractive; the other 
claims that recompense is multiplicative. The experiment reported in this sec-
tion illustrates how functional measurement methodology can be used to dis-
tinguish between these two schemes - while still allowing for personal values 
of each individual judge. 
Previous work in this research program has found that recompense is 
nonadditive in its effects (e.g., Hommers & Anderson, 1985). The pattern of 
the data thus disagreed with the subtractive scheme and was, indeed, consistent 
with a multiplying scheme. These results were not definitive with respect to the 
two schemes, however, because the same data pattern could be produced by an 
averaging rule with differential weighting for recompense. The averaging rule, 
however, has a cognitive structure similar to that of the subtracting scheme. 
The purpose of this experiment was to test between multiplying and averaging 
processes of recompense integration. 
Using the stamp scenario of Hommers and Anderson (1985), subjects were 
told stories about two stamp collectors, one of whom ruined some stamps 
belonging to the other. They were told to imagine that they were the victim and 
to say how much the offender should be punished. The stories presented culpa, 
damage, and recompense information. The three levels of culpa described ac-
cidental, careless, and intentional acts. The two levels of damage stated that 
two or ten stamps were ruined. The three levels of recompense stated that none, 
half, or all of the ruined stamps were replaced by the offender. Subjects re-
ceived information about just two of the three specified variables on each trial. 
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This information was presented according to the two-factor designs shown in 
the three panels of Figure 9.1. In addition, judgments were obtained based on 
each single piece of information to provide scale-free, crossover tests that 
discriminate between the averaging and multiplying rules. 
Subjects made their punishment judgments on a graphic rating scale. 
General procedure was similar to that used in previous experiments (Hommers 
& Anderson, 1985) employing the methodology of functional measurement. 
Subjects were students from introductory psychology courses at the University 
of California, San Diego. 
Three main results were obtained. First, the culpa-damage integration was 
additive, whereas the recompense-damage and recompense-culpa integrations 
were nonadditive. Second, the scale-free tests supported the averaging rule and 
disagreed with the simple subtracting and multiplying rules. Third, the 
paradoxically large effect of recompense observed in previous work was con-
firmed. 
Integration Rules 
The data are summarized in Figure 9.1, in which each panel represents the in-
tegration rule for one pair of information variables. In the left panel, the two 
solid curves portray the damage-culpa integration. The number by each curve 
represents the number of damaged stamps, so the difference between the two 
solid curves shows how the damage variable affects the judgement of punish-
ment. The upward trend of these curves represents the effect of culpa, with 
more punishment being assigned for greater culpa. 
The main characteristics of these two solid curves is that they are parallel. 
By virtue of the parallelism theorem (Anderson, 1981), this implies that 
damage and culpa are integrated by an adding-type rule. This replicates previ-
ous work that has studied these two variables (Hommers & Anderson, 1985; 
Leon, 1980; Surber, 1982). 
The three solid curves in the center panel portray the integration rule for 
recompense and culpa. These curves, however, appear to be quite nonparallel. 
Nonparallelism implies that the integration does not obey an adding rule. 
Similarly, the two solid curves in the right panel portray the integration rule 
for recompense and damage. Here again, the nonparallelism points to a 
nonadditive integration. Recompense is thus nonadditively processed. 
Evidence for Averaging 
Closer analysis of the data shows that the integration rule is actually one of 
averaging for all three pairs of variables. The averaging rule has some fun-
damental consequences for cognitive theory so the data analysis needs detailed 
consideration. The key to the analysis lies in the relation between the dashed 
curve and the solid curves in each panel. Each dashed curve represents judg-
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FIGURE 9.1. Assigned punishment as a function of culpa, damage, and recompense. Each 
panel gives factorial graph for one two-factor design, with the two moral variables listed as 
curve parameter and on horizontal axis. Dashed curves denote response to single moral vari-
able listed on horizontal axis (ACC., accidental; CARE., careless; INT., intentional) 
ments based on just one variable. In the left panel, for example, the label N.S. 
means that damage was not specified so the judgment was made only on the 
basis of culpa. The fact that the dashed curve crosses over one or more of the 
solid curves provides the critical support for averaging. 
The logic of this crossover test (Anderson, 1981) applies as follows to the 
present task. In the left panel, both the additive and the averaging rules can 
account for the parallelism of the solid curves, but only the averaging rule can 
account for the crossover. To see this, note that the dashed curve represents 
judgments based on culpa information alone. Comparison of the dashed curve 
with the solid curve labeled 2 shows what happens when the information is 
added that two stamps were damaged. If this information had an additive ef-
fect, then the solid curve would have to lie entirely on one side of the dashed 
curve. This prediction does not require that the additive effects be 
mathematically exact, only that the direction of effect be the same at each 
point. The crossover thus is not consistent with any form of summation model. 
Under the averaging hypothesis, the added information about two dam-
aged stamps is averaged in with the culpa information. This is the milder level 
of damage and may be assumed to have a value around the midpoint of the 
scale. Since this value is greater than the leftmost point on the dashed curve, 
averaging it in will raise the response; and since this value is lower than the 
rightmost point on the dashed curve, averaging it in will lower the response. 
In this way, the averaging model accounts for the crossover in the left panel 
of Figure 9.1. 
In the other two panels of Figure 9.1, the theoretical issue is to test between 
the averaging and the multiplying rules. Here again the issue rests on a com-
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parison of the dashed and solid curves. The averaging rule provides a 
straightforward account of the crossover, in accord with the logic already 
discussed. 
In contrast, the multiplying rule cannot account for these data patterns. 
This rule requires that the dashed and solid curves form a linear fan with a 
common point of intersection. But in the center panel, the dashed curve in-
tersects the two solid curves at different elevations, and the solid curves would 
only intersect if extrapolated to the left. Similarly, in the right panel, the 
dashed curve intersects the lower solid curve around half recompense, whereas 
the two solid curves intersect around full recompense. These data pattern are 
therefore sharply inconsistent with the multiplying rule. In short, these em-
pirical analyses support a revised scheme S and infirm scheme M. 
Paradoxical Effect of Recompense 
Recompense had a much larger effect than the damage for which recompense 
was given. This, may be seen in Figure 9.1 by comparing the left and center 
panels. The effect of damage is given by the vertical separation between the 
two damage curves labeled 2 and 10 in the left panel. Similarly, the effect of 
recompense is given by the vertical separation among the curves in the center 
panel. As can be seen, the effect of recompense is three or four times larger 
than the effect of damage. This is paradoxical because the objective value of 
recompense is necessarily restricted by the damage. 
This paradoxically large effect of recompense has been observed previously 
(Hommers & Anderson, 1985, in preparation). The theoretical interpretation 
is that recompense has two components. One component refers to the actual 
damage, and constitutes material restitution. The second component refers to 
the moral character of the harmdoer; recompense decreases the culpa of the 
harm doer and thereby decreases the assigned punishment according to the 
foregoing blame schema. This second component makes it possible for the ef-
fect of recompense to be greater than the actual damage. 
This large effect of recompense may seem to differ from legal thought. Von 
Linstow's (1974) formula represented recompense as a multiplicative factor be-
tween 0.8 and 1.0. Since this multiplies (culpa + damage), the reduction in 
punishment could mathematically exceed the damage term, but only if culpa 
were much larger than damage. But scheme M cannot account for the three-
to-fourfold effect observed in Figure 9.1. On the other hand, the report of 
Thomas (1970, p. 197) on the sentencing policy of the British Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division indicates that small amounts of recompense are ineffective: 
only "quite obviously quite substantial restitution" is an important factor. 
Although the present experiment did not test small amounts of recompense, 
the foregoing two-component interpretation implies that even apology or 
remorse, without any material restitution, could have sizeable effects in con-
trast to the British Court of Appeal. Of course, this contrast between legal 
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thought and everyday morality may reflect the severity of the offenses. 
Whereas the culpa component may be large relative to a few ruined stamps 
among friends, it may be small relative to the offenses that reach the courts. 
Functional Measurement Methodology 
A detailed exposition of functional measurement cannot be given here, but a 
few comments are needed to indicate how it may be useful for further study 
of legal schemes. For illustration, consider the hypothesis that culpa and 
damage are integrated by an adding-type scheme: 
Punishment = Culpa + Damage. 
The natural way to test this scheme is to measure punishment, culpa, and 
damage, and check whether they do indeed add up. But this imposes stringent 
measurement conditions. If the three variables are measured on rank-order 
scales, for example, they will surely not add up. In general, they will only add 
up if the three variables are measured on true psychological scales, in this case 
on scales with equal intervals and a known zero point. 
How to obtain true psychological scales has been controversial in psycholo-
gy since Fechner's study of psychophysical laws. Only recently has a method 
been developed with reasonably general capability for such psychological mea-
surement. One part of this method is the parallelism theorem, which was ap-
plied to test the hypothesis that the culpa-damage integration obeyed an ad-
ding-type rule. By virtue of the parallelism theorem, an observed pattern of 
parallel data curves implies an adding-type rule of integration. Prior measure-
ment of culpa and damage is not needed to test this integration rule. No more 
is necessary than that the response of judged punishment be on a scale with 
equal intervals - but this itself follows from observed parallelism. The 
parallelism theorem is thus a powerful tool because it can simultaneously 
validate the response measure and the integration rule. 
The information about the values of the stimulus variables, in this case 
culpa and damage, is contained in the distances among the points in the 
graphs. For example, the closeness of the two solid curves in the left panel of 
Figure 9.1 implies that ten damaged stamps is not considered much worse than 
two damaged stamps. Recompense had far larger effects, as already noted in 
the discussion of the vertical separation of the solid curves in the middle panel. 
These considerations may be put into quantitative form to obtain true 
psychological scales of the stimulus variables. 
Of special importance is that the parallelism theorem can be applied to the 
data of individual subjects. The graph in the left panel of Figure 9.1 is an aver-
age over the group of subjects. Thus, it rests on the uniformity assumption that 
all subjects are similar with respect to the scheme. But similar graphs can be 
constructed for each individual using several trials per stimulus to control for 
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measurement error. The basic aspect of this topic is taken up later in the 
discussion of personal design. 
Functional measurement methodology is not a routine recipe. Success 
depends on the use of certain experimental techniques (see Anderson, 1982, 
Chap. 1). Success also depends heavily on the actual operativeness of algebraic 
schemes of integration. Fortunately, experimental studies in many different 
areas of psychology have found extensive evidence for a general cognitive 
algebra (see Anderson, 1981, Chap. 1). The present experiment may illustrate 
something of the potential of this approach to test the cognitive validity of 
schemes of legal thought. 
Legal Schemes as Heuristics for Cognitive Science 
The foregoing experimental results have illustrated how legal thought can serve 
as a heuristic for cognitive science. This approach goes beyond mere compari-
son of prescriptive schemes with moral cognition to use those schemes as part 
of substantive inquiry. Two or three aspects of this approach deserve comment. 
Structure of Recompense 
The functional measurement analysis yielded an unexpected empirical answer 
to the two conflicting legal schemes for recompense: Both were partly correct, 
as represented in the averaging rule. The scale-free tests ruled out the hypothe-
sis of scheme S that recompense operates by simple subtraction. These tests 
also ruled out the hypothesis of scheme M that recompense operates by simple 
multiplication. Instead, the operative rule was found to be averaging with dif-
ferential weighting. The integration process itself is thus one of subtraction. 
At the same time, however, the differential weights act multiplicatively as a 
level-specific modifier on the values of recompense. This differentially 
weighted averaging produces the fan pattern seen in the middle and right 
panels of Figure 9.1. At the surface level this fan pattern would seem to sup-
port the prescriptive multiplying rule of Von Linstow (1974). The deeper 
cognitive analysis revealed a rather different and more complex structure of 
recompense. 
The problem of structure also appears in the paradoxical effect of re-
compense. Although nominally bounded by the actual damage, recompense 
actually had far larger effects. This result, together with the averaging rule, 
suggests that recompense may not be a distinct moral category. Thus, the sim-
ple prescriptive theory of recompense, where recompense is a mitigating factor 
only in the case of a "quite obviously quite substantial restitution" (Thomas, 
1970, p. 197), is not valid in layperson's judgments in two respects. First, even 
half recompense reduced punishment considerably. Second, recompense had 
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a more complex structure than culpa and damage, as shown by the differential 
weighting of recompense instead of constant weighting for culpa and damage. 
These comments suggest that recompense effects may be mediated by more 
basic moral categories. Legal thought, as indicated by § 46 of the German 
Penal code (1975), suggests a two-component structure of recompense (Bruns, 
1974, 1980; Maurach, G6ssel, & Zipf, 1978; Zipf, 1977). The act component 
refers to the actual decrease of damage, and the harmdoer component refers 
to moral virtue demonstrated by the act itself. 
Two directions of further work deserve consideration: (a) the structure of 
recompense, and (b) the generality and universality of the findings on harm 
and recompense. With respect to the structure of recompense, further em-
pirical work is needed to explore the two-component theory from § 46 more 
carefully. For example, the nonadditivity of recompense may be associated 
with one of the two components inherent in voluntary recompense by the 
harmdoer: remorse and compensation. This might be studied with a duplex 
response procedure in which subjects make two separate judgments, one for 
punishment and one for recompense. These two judgments correspond to the 
foregoing act and harmdoer components, reflecting the dual structure of civil 
and criminal law. 
With respect to generality, experimental tests are needed with other 
scenarios than the damaged stamps, which may differ in content, in severeness 
of the harm, and in complexity of the circumstances. With respect to univer-
sality, the validity for different populations, especially for experts such as 
lawyers and judges, may be examined. Finally, further work may meaningfully 
extend the general strategy by using other legal schemes as heuristic tools for 
cognitive science (Hommers, 1981, 1988; Hommers & Anderson, in prepara-
tion). 
Process and Value 
The prescriptive schemes of legal thought included a distinction between pro-
cess and value. Processes should obey general rules, whereas values may be per-
sonal. Valuation, of course, is a matter of expert judgment, and is also sen-
sitive to particulars of the actual situation. In legal thought, however, values 
are not totally personal; much valuation is constrained by the sentencing 
frames of the Penal codes or by the guidelines ("Taxes") of Court Benches. 
Nevertheless, the law leaves some room for personal valuation that is not ex-
plicitly prescribed and not regarded as error or deviance. 
A parallel distinction between general processes and personal values ap-
pears in the theory of information integration. Integration theory allows and 
indeed insists that values are sensitive to individual and situation. The rules for 
integrating these values, however, are considered to have substantial invariance. 
This rule generality provides a theoretical foundation for value analysis by 
means of functional measurement methodology. 
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Value analysis, of course, has a different emphasis in legal thought than in 
the theory of information integration. Integration theory is descriptive and 
makes no attempt to constrain values to any prescriptive norm. Rather it aims 
at cognitive analysis, beginning with the problem of measuring personal 
values. Legal thought, in contrast, tries to standardize and reduce personal 
values in order to make the sentences of judges more uniform. Despite this 
prescriptive emphasis, there is a need for cognitive analysis of value in legal 
judgments. This may be seen in divided court decisions, which presumably 
result because different judges put different values and weights on the same 
evidence. Some allowance for personal values is inherent in the operation of 
legal systems, represented in the discretion of individual judges. Some cases, 
moreover, are so complicated that experts as well as laypersons may use 
simplified schemes to integrate the evidence in place of the prescriptive scheme. 
To determine this, however, requires analysis in terms of personal values. 
Hence it is desirable, even necessary, to analyze legal judgment within a 
cognitive framework. This problem is taken up in the following section. 
Analysis of Algebraic Schemes in Legal Psychology 
Linear Models for Correlational Analysis 
In legal psychology the statistical approach of linear regression models for cor-
relations is widely used as illustrated in the seminal field studies of bail setting 
and sentencing reported by Konecni and Ebbesen (1982). This statistical ap-
proach depends on aggregating many cases, each coded in terms of pertinent 
variables. Criminal sentences, for example, could be coded in terms of severity 
of sentence, together with such predictor variables as kind and severity of of-
fense, extenuating circumstances, prior offenses, and so forth. Thus coded, the 
data could be subjected to ordinary multiple regression analysis or to log-linear 
analysis (e.g., Haberman, 1978), which performs similar functions for qualita-
tive, categorical data. 
Such statistical analysis has many uses. Foremost is that it provides an over-
view of the operation of legal systems that is essential for evaluating how and 
how well they function. Unexpected benefits may also be obtained. For exam-
ple, a nuisance finding that complicated the statistical analysis of bail setting 
by Ebbesen and Konecni (1975) was that one or another important piece of 
information was absent in about 35070 of the cases. This missing information 
reflects the exigencies and distractions of the courtroom situation. As noted 
by Anderson (1976, 1981), much might be done for justice by the simple device 
of instituting a standard information schedule for each case. 
Nevertheless, this correlational approach has well-known limitations, 
especially as concerns causal interpretation from the correlational data base. 
In their study of sentencing, for example, Konecni and Ebbesen (1982) were 
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unable to distinguish two simple and quite different causal models. Another 
example comes from the present experiment, in which the scale-free tests were 
able to distinguish between the multiplying model and the differential 
weighted averaging model. The linear regression approach generally cannot 
distinguish between these two models, although they represent quite different 
cognitive processes. For cognitive theory, therefore, the statistical approach has 
limited relevance. The valuation and integration operations in the statistical 
model are unlikely to bear any clear or definite relation to the valuation and 
integration processes of individual judges. 
As regards valuation, the statistical approach depends on selection and 
coding of variables, which must then be applied uniformly across a hetero-
geneous mass of cases. The judge, in contrast, evaluates the evidence by 
reference to a background of expert knowledge, involving legal, sociological, 
cultural, and moral variables that have no representation in the statistical 
model. 
As regards integration, the statistical models have repeatedly been shown 
to misrepresent cognitive process. This has been found in clinical psychology, 
personnel selection, and Bayesian decision theory, where statistical methods 
outperformed clinical psychologists in predicting outcome of therapy, but were 
insensitive and misleading about cognitive process (see Anderson, 1981, pp. 
22-23, 91; Wright, 1984, Chap. 6). Some signs indicate the same for legal 
judgment (Anderson, 1982, pp. 304, 306; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1975). More-
over, Ebbesen and Konecni (1982, p. 291ff.) found that severity ratings of 
judges and probation officers contributed most to the sentencing variance. 
However, no attempt was made to explain the processes that determine the 
severity ratings. Thus, for analysis of cognitive process, it seems essential to 
use stronger methods than linear regression. 
Observational Analysis 
A natural approach for the study of algebraic schemes in cognitive processes 
in legal thought and practice is through analysis of actual cases. This may be 
done phenomenologically, with a focus on single cases, following the case 
tradition of Anglo-Saxon law. Indeed, judges' opinions constitute a 
phenomenological data base, for they reflect judges' valuation and integration 
processes. This is the natural place to begin the study of judicial judgment. 
Such phenomenological reports can provide priceless information about 
cognitive processes. Of special interest' are background knowledge and 
cognitive operators developed through extended legal experience. 
Judges' opinions are self-report data, of course, and so must be expected 
to suffer the same limitations and pitfalls that have been found with self-report 
data throughout psychology. An example appears in Bauer's (1984) study of 
sentencing by German judges in traffic cases. Although length of sentence had 
a high correlation with the facts of the case, the written justifications were 
largely stereotypic commonplaces that had little relation to length of sentence. 
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For both legal analysis and cognitive analysis, therefore, in-depth interviews of 
the judges would be desirable to reduce ambiguity and incompleteness of the 
written record. In the present approach, however, these phenomenological data 
are not ends in themselves, but rather a beginning for experimental analysis. 
The problem is to find some way to embed experimental analysis of cognitive 
process within realistic legal settings. This problem is considered next. 
Embedding Method and Personal Design 
A primary goal of the present theory is to unite phenomenological and ex-
perimental analysis for the study of judgment and decision in natural settings. 
Phenomenological analysis can provide invaluable clues about cognition, but 
these clues are notoriously fallible. In the meaning constancy studies of person 
cognition, for example, it seemed phenomenological clear and apparent that 
trait adjectives strongly affected each others' meanings in a person description. 
Cognitive analysis showed this to be untrue (Anderson, 1981, Chap. 3). The 
methods of information integration theory were able to distinguish cognitive 
reality from phenomenologically illusion. This unified phenomenological-ex-
perimental approach may be obtainable with use of embedding method and 
personal design. 
The embedding method, as the name suggests, involves embedding an in-
tegration task within a relevant social context. The purpose of the embedding 
is to allow experimental manipulation of some stimulus information within the 
chosen social context. Personal design carries this to the limit by constructing 
the integration task within the knowledge system of a selected individual. 
Embedding within a legal setting could begin with a base case from some 
actual jurisdiction, selected to allow realistic manipulation of relevant vari-
ables. Multiple variants would then be constructed, each differing in realistic 
specifics from the base case. Such variables could include purposiveness of the 
offense, extenuating circumstances, motivation and personal character of the 
harmdoer, and so forth. By using factorial-type design, as in the present ex-
periment, the patterning in the data can allow straightforward diagnosis of cer-
tain integration rules, as illustrated in Figure 9.1. Although group data were 
analyzed here, the same procedures can be applied to individual data. 
Personal design carries the embedding method further by using the in-
dividual for selection both of the base case and of the stimulus information 
variables. Since task and design are both personalized, the assumption of 
uniformity across subjects would no longer be necessary. Moreover, 
phenomenological and prior observational analyses could be incorporated 
within a rigorous experimental design and extended through experimental 
analysis. Personal design can allow for knowledge that does not ascend to the 
level of consciousness and phenomenological report. Many cognitive factors 
will never reach the phenomenological level. These include unconscious or 
unverbalizable motivations, as well as cultural and judicial assumptions so 
taken for granted that the judge is unaware of making them. This application 
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of the functional measurement methodology may provide a validational 
framework for phenomenology and observation in case studies that enables 
separation of cognitive reality from phenomenological illusion. 
Some loss of realism is inevitable even with the embedding method. A per-
sonal design would ordinarily be presented in the quiet of a judge's chambers, 
not in the hubbub of the courtroom. Missing, therefore, would be multifarious 
aspects of courtroom atmosphere, including informational cues not in the per-
sonal design, together with lapses of attention and flashes of humor and irrita-
tion that distinguish an actual court. But what is being studied is the cognitive 
system of the judge, which is assumed to be the same in chambers as on the 
bench. The integration rules may thus be expected to have reasonable generali-
ty, even though the specific information being integrated may differ markedly 
across cases. The valuation processes, similarly, may be expected to be reason-
ably general, even though the specific information being evaluated is variable 
across cases. Although loss of courtroom realism could be serious for 
sociological studies of actual outcomes, many process questions can be studied 
outside of the actual courtroom. 
Personal design would be expected to elucidate the judge's ideal of justice, 
which may differ from courtroom practice for various reasons already in-
dicated. If this is a limitation, it is also an advantage, and it may even be in-
structive for judges to face their actual mode of operation dissected in this 
manner (Anderson, 1976). 
The case method of instruction in law has an important similarity to the 
embedding method. Study of past cases in lawbooks may actually have less 
realism than cases in a personal design, yet it is a preferred mode of instruc-
tion. The case method could, moreover, be coupled with the embedding meth-
od. Law students would thus consider not just the single case, but a number 
of variant cases designed to have legal interest and to satisfy conditions for 
functional measurement. In this way, it would be possible to embed the study 
of legal cognition within legal curricula. 
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